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The Economics of Immigration 
Reform 
Howard F. Chang* 
In this article, I draw upon economic theory and recent empirical work 
on the economic and fiscal effects of immigration to evaluate some recent 
proposals for immigration reform in terms of their effects on the economic 
welfare of natives in the United States. In particular, I consider the 
Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy (“RAISE”) Act, a 
bill that would cut immigration to half of its current level. President 
Donald Trump has endorsed the RAISE Act and has insisted that many of 
its provisions be part of any legislation legalizing the status of 
unauthorized immigrants granted relief under the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program. I compare this restrictionist 
proposal to the comprehensive immigration reform bill passed by the 
Senate in 2013, which would have liberalized admissions to the United 
States. I conclude that economic analysis militates in favor of liberalizing 
our immigration restrictions, as proposed in 2013, instead of imposing the 
drastic new restrictions proposed in the RAISE Act. 
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The people of the United States and our elected representatives 
remain sharply divided on the issue of immigration. In August 2017, 
President Donald Trump announced his support for an immigration 
bill introduced by Republican Senators Tom Cotton and David Perdue, 
the Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy 
(“RAISE”) Act.1 If enacted, the RAISE Act would slash legal 
immigration drastically, cutting immigration in half within a decade.2 
This announcement reveals that President Trump’s hostility toward 
immigration is not limited to unauthorized immigration but instead 
extends more broadly to legal immigration as well. 
In September 2017, the Trump administration announced its 
decision to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(“DACA”) program adopted in 2012 by President Barack Obama for 
certain immigrants who immigrated illegally as children.3 The DACA 
program provides these unauthorized immigrants temporary but 
renewable protection from deportation and authorization for 
employment in the United States. Although President Trump urged 
Congress to provide these immigrants relief from deportation through 
legislation,4 in October 2017, he released a long list of restrictionist 
provisions he would demand in exchange for any such relief.5 His long 
list of demands includes the new immigration restrictions proposed by 
the RAISE Act.6 Restrictionist demands by President Trump and his 
Republican allies in Congress have remained obstacles to efforts to 
enact legislation granting relief to DACA recipients.7 
These proposed restrictions stand in stark contrast to the 
comprehensive immigration reform bill passed by the Senate in 2013 
with bipartisan support (68-32, with all Democrats and fourteen 
 
 1 Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy Act, S. 1720, 115th 
Cong. (2017); David Nakamura, Trump, GOP Senators Introduce Bill to Slash Legal 
Immigration Levels, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/post-politics/wp/2017/08/02/trump-gop-senators-to-introduce-bill-to-slash-legal-
immigration-levels/?utm_term=.903007a09063. 
 2 See Nakamura, supra note 1. 
 3 Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to End DACA and Calls 
on Congress to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2x7xOo2. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Priscilla Alvarez, The White House Lays Out Its Conditions for Extending DACA, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/the-
white-house-lays-out-its-demands-for-daca/542376/. 
 6 See id. 
 7 See Alicia Parlapiano, Dreamers’ Fate Is Now Tied to Border Wall and Other 
G.O.P. Immigration Demands, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2Bu16i2 
(noting that the Senate voted on, but failed to pass, three different immigration plans 
due to President Trump’s demands). 
  
114 University of California, Davis [Vol. 52:111 
Republicans voting in favor), the Border Security, Economic 
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (“2013 bill”).8 The 
Republicans in control of the House of Representatives, however, 
never brought the 2013 bill up for a vote, because conservative 
members opposed any “amnesty” for unauthorized immigrants.9 
Unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have included several 
reforms that would liberalize admissions to the United States.10 Which 
of these contrasting approaches would improve our immigration 
system? 
As the reference to a “Strong Economy” in the title of the RAISE Act 
suggests, its proponents tout the bill on economic grounds. What does 
economic theory suggest about the effect of immigration on economic 
welfare? For the economist, the international migration of workers is 
one facet of globalization, which economists understand to mean our 
evolution toward a world economy that is integrated across national 
boundaries.11 Economists generally welcome the development of such 
a global common market, prescribing free trade in goods as the regime 
that maximizes global economic welfare. Economists also recommend 
liberalized trade as a policy that is likely to produce gains for each 
national economy. 
Economists also recognize that the same theory that they apply to 
international trade in goods also applies to international trade in other 
markets.12 Nations can gain from the free movement of not only goods 
but also workers because labor mobility allows them to enjoy gains 
from international trade in the labor market. We would expect 
workers to migrate from economies that offer them low wages to 
economies that offer them higher wages. As a result of this migration, 
the output of the global economy grows. Higher wages in the country 
of immigration imply that the marginal product of labor is higher 
 
 8 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, 
S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013); see Ed O’Keefe, Senate Approves Comprehensive 
Immigration Bill, WASH. POST (June 27, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/senate-poised-to-approve-massive-immigration-bill/2013/06/27/87168096-df32-
11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html?utm_term=.f95da6eeacb2. 
 9 Ashley Parker & Jonathan Weisman, Republicans in House Resist Overhaul for 
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2013), https://nyti.ms/2Nit2Zu. 
 10 See infra Part III.A. 
 11 See Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare 
and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1148-49 (1997) 
[hereinafter Liberalized Immigration]. 
 12 This discussion draws from Howard F. Chang, The Economic Impact of 
International Labor Migration: Recent Estimates and Policy Implications, 16 TEMPLE POL. 
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 321, 322 (2007) [hereinafter Recent Estimates]. 
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there than in the country of emigration. That is, higher wages for the 
same worker mean that the worker produces more value in the 
country of immigration than in the country of emigration. Labor 
migration generally leads to net gains for the world as a whole, 
because labor flows to the economy where it can produce the most 
value. Thus, basic economic theory raises a presumption in favor of 
the free movement of workers. Immigration restrictions distort the 
global labor market by interfering with the efficient allocation of 
workers among national economies, thereby wasting human resources 
and generating poverty in countries of emigration. 
The greater the inequality in wages among countries, the costlier the 
distortion of the global labor market caused by immigration 
restrictions, and the greater the gains from liberalizing labor 
migration. Given the degree of wage inequality in the world, it should 
be apparent that the economic gains from liberalized labor migration 
are enormous.13 These considerations militate in favor of liberalized 
migration, not reduced levels of migration. 
The proponents of the RAISE Act, however, do not seek to promote 
global economic welfare. Instead, Senator Perdue looks to the national 
interests of the United States, complaining that our current 
immigration system “does not meet the needs of our economy.”14 
Furthermore, President Trump makes clear that he discounts the 
interests of prospective immigrants when he weighs the costs and 
benefits of immigration reforms. He claims that the RAISE Act would 
replace current immigration policies with a system that “puts America 
first.”15 
What light does the economic literature shed on these claims 
regarding our national economic welfare? Suppose we were to set 
aside the interests of immigrants and instead adopt the “America first” 
perspective suggested by President Trump and other advocates of the 
RAISE Act. In this article, I will focus narrowly on the effects of our 
current flow of immigrants on the economic welfare of natives, that is, 
those born in the United States. This article draws upon economic 
theory and recent empirical work on the economic and fiscal effects of 
immigration into the United States and evaluates these recent 
 
 13 For surveys of some empirical estimates of these gains, see id. at 323-24 and 
Michael A. Clemens, Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?, 
25 J. ECON. PERSP. 83, 83-87 (2011). 
 14 Peter Baker, Trump Supports Plan to Cut Legal Immigration by Half, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 2, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2hnAref (quoting Sen. Perdue). 
 15 Id. (quoting President Trump). 
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proposals for immigration reform in terms of their effects on the 
economic welfare of natives. 
In Part I, I will review estimates of the economic and fiscal benefits 
of immigration, which suggest that liberalizing rather than restricting 
access to immigrant visas would serve the economic interests of 
natives. In Part II, I rebut claims that the RAISE Act would serve the 
national interest by improving the selection of immigrants. In Part III, 
I compare the RAISE Act with the comprehensive immigration reform 
bill passed by the Senate in 2013, which would have liberalized 
admissions to the United States. I discuss how the 2013 bill would do 
a better job of serving the economic interest of natives than the RAISE 
Act. In Part IV, I conclude that economic analysis militates in favor of 
liberalizing our restrictive immigration laws instead of imposing new 
restrictions like those proposed in the RAISE Act, suggesting that the 
2013 bill provides a much more promising framework for 
comprehensive immigration reform. 
I. NET BENEFITS FOR NATIVES FROM IMMIGRATION 
Would the effects of immigrant workers in the labor market be in 
the economic interest of natives? Economists agree that the effect of 
immigrant workers in the labor market is on balance positive for 
natives as a group. If we examine the effects of immigrants in the labor 
market, we find that the natives of the country of immigration, taken 
together, will on balance gain from the immigration of workers.16 
Natives enjoy a net gain from employing immigrant workers: they gain 
a surplus in excess of what they pay immigrants for their labor. In 
2014, the economist George Borjas produced a range of crude 
estimates for the surplus that natives enjoy as a result of the 
participation of immigrants in our labor market, and using a variety of 
assumptions, he derives estimates ranging from $2.6 billion to $201.8 
billion in income every year.17 
Even as natives enjoy net benefits from immigrant workers in the 
labor market, however, immigrants may still pose a risk of a fiscal 
burden on natives through the public treasury. In fact, Senator Cotton 
cites the threat of a fiscal burden in defense of the RAISE Act. He 
claims that many immigrants are a “net cost to our economy because 
of the transfer payments” they receive through “public assistance” 
 
 16 Chang, Recent Estimates, supra note 12, at 324-25. 
 17 GEORGE J. BORJAS, IMMIGRATION ECONOMICS 158 (2014) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION 
ECONOMICS]. 
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programs.18 President Trump claims that the RAISE Act would “save 
taxpayers billions and billions of dollars.”19 The empirical evidence, 
however, suggests that immigrants generally confer a fiscal benefit 
rather than impose a fiscal burden on natives. 
A. Fiscal Impact 
In 1997, the National Research Council (“NRC”) conducted the first 
study to attempt a comprehensive calculation of the fiscal impact of 
immigration in the United States, taking into account the 
contributions made to tax revenues and the costs imposed on the 
public treasury not only by the immigrants themselves but also by 
their descendants.20 The NRC generated a range of estimates for the 
total fiscal impact, including the effects at the state level as well as 
those at the federal level, using a variety of assumptions.21 Using the 
most reasonable set of assumptions for its “baseline” scenario, the 
NRC found that the average recent immigrant in 1996 had a positive 
fiscal impact of $80,000 in net present value in 1996 dollars.22 
More recently, in 2017, the National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine (“National Academies”) updated those 
NRC estimates, accounting for changes in circumstances over the 
intervening two decades.23 The National Academies generate a range 
of estimates of the total fiscal impact of immigration in the United 
States, again using a wide variety of assumptions.24 Although the 
National Academies use more conservative assumptions than used for 
 
 18 Peter M. Robinson, Senator Tom Cotton, Immigration Reform, and the RAISE Act, 
HOOVER INST. (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.hoover.org/research/senator-tom-cotton-
immigration-reform-and-raise-act (quoting Sen. Cotton). 
 19 Andrew V. Pestano, Trump Unveils Merit-Based Immigration Bill Favoring 
English-Speaking Applicants, UPI (Aug. 2, 2017, 1:27 PM), https://upi.com/6615402 
(quoting President Trump). 
 20 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND 
FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 302 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997) 
[hereinafter NRC] (noting that “we must include in the calculation changes in taxes 
and expenditures associated not only with the immigrant, but also with her 
descendants”). 
 21 See id. at 337. 
 22 See id. at 325-26, 336-37. 
 23 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL CONSEQUENCES 
OF IMMIGRATION 413 (Francine D. Blau & Christopher Mackie eds., 2017) [hereinafter 
NATIONAL ACADEMIES] (noting that “both immigrants and government budgets have 
changed since the mid-1990s, when a similar exercise was undertaken”). 
 24 See generally id. at 428-60 (providing a variety of estimates). 
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the NRC’s baseline scenario,25 they nevertheless generate estimates 
showing that current immigrants have a much greater positive fiscal 
impact than they did twenty years ago. Under the set of assumptions 
that most closely approximates the NRC’s baseline scenario, the 
National Academies found that the average recent immigrant has a 
positive fiscal impact of $279,000 in net present value in 2012 
dollars.26 That is, even after accounting for inflation, the fiscal benefit 
conferred by the average immigrant has more than doubled in the past 
twenty years.27 
Unlike the NRC report, the National Academies report presents a 
wide range of estimates without identifying a single set of assumptions 
as the most reasonable to use as a baseline scenario. The more agnostic 
stance adopted by the National Academies may be a response to 
objections raised by the economist George Borjas, who has disputed 
the assumptions adopted by the NRC for its baseline scenario.28 Borjas 
served on both the panel that produced the 1997 NRC report and the 
panel that produced the 2017 National Academies report.29 Given the 
relatively agnostic stance adopted by the National Academies, a closer 
examination of the assumptions adopted by the NRC is useful for 
understanding how the assumptions underlying the NRC baseline 
scenario are more reasonable than the alternatives and why 
immigration confers such a large fiscal benefit on natives in the United 
States. 
1. Public Goods 
First, the NRC notes that “a larger population helps to bear the costs 
of so-called public goods — those that provide services to all in the 
population at a cost that does not rise with the size of the 
population.”30 As any introductory economics textbook explains, the 
defining features of a “public good” are that “people cannot be 
 
 25 For an extended discussion of these assumptions, see infra Part I.A.2. 
 26 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 446. 
 27 According to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) calculated by the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, $279,000 in 2012 dollars is equivalent to about $191,000 in 1996 
dollars. See BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TABLE 24: HISTORICAL CONSUMER 
PRICE INDEX FOR ALL URBAN CONSUMERS (CPI-U), at 4 (2017), https://www.bls.gov/ 
cpi/tables/historical-cpi-u-201709.pdf. 
 28 See GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN’S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMY 124-25 (1999) [hereinafter HEAVEN’S DOOR] (objecting to the NRC 
assumptions about future fiscal policies). 
 29 NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at v; NRC, supra note 20, at iii. 
 30 NRC, supra note 20, at 302. 
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prevented from using a public good” and that “one person’s use of a 
public good does not reduce another person’s ability to use it.”31 A 
classic textbook example of a public good is national defense, because 
“it is impossible to prevent any single person from enjoying the benefit 
of this defense,” and “when one person enjoys the benefit of national 
defense, he does not reduce the benefit to anyone else.”32 That is, a 
pure public good like national defense is not subject to congestion and 
is thus not “rival in consumption.”33 The NRC notes that other public 
goods include “research on health and science.”34 
The NRC distinguishes these public goods from other government 
services, such as “services from roads, sewers, police and fire 
departments, libraries, airports, and foreign embassies,” which “are 
highly congestible.”35 Insofar as immigration increases the population 
served, a larger population would “crowd the existing social 
infrastructure, including roads, libraries, airports, sewage and water 
supply systems, and public buildings,” and these “congestion costs” 
would require a government to increase its expenditures to maintain 
the same quality of service for natives.36 Therefore, the NRC treats 
these goods “as if immigrants raise both the demand for them and the 
cost of meeting that demand, in proportion to their numbers.”37 The 
different treatment of public goods has a significant effect on the 
NRC’s calculations. For example, if the NRC were to treat public 
goods as if they were “congestible goods,” then the NRC would have 
concluded that the average immigrant imposes a net fiscal cost of 
$5,000 rather than providing a net fiscal benefit of $80,000 in net 
present value in 1996 dollars.38 This important effect is no surprise, as 
noted by the National Academies, because “public goods such as 
national defense represent a large part of the federal budget.”39 
The National Academies also note that “interest on the national 
debt” may be treated as a pure public good.40 The federal government 
 
 31 N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 226 (5th ed. 2008). 
 32 Id. at 228. 
 33 Id. 
 34 NRC, supra note 20, at 302; see MANKIW, supra note 31, at 229 (noting that 
basic research is also a public good). 
 35 NRC, supra note 20, at 303. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 346. 
 39 NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 357. National defense alone “accounts 
for about 18 percent of the U.S. federal budget.” Id. at 345. 
 40 Id. at 345. 
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would owe this interest on a certain stock of debt that would exist 
even in the absence of more immigration. These interest payments 
“represent the cost of servicing debt attributable to past spending and 
deficits from which new immigrants did not benefit.”41 As the NRC 
notes, “a larger population helps to bear the burden of the preexisting 
public debt through tax payments to cover interest or repayment 
charges.”42 Treating interest payments as a public good has an 
important effect. For example, if the NRC were to treat them as a 
“private good” rather than as a public good, then the NRC would have 
concluded that the average immigrant provides a net fiscal benefit of 
only $31,000 rather than $80,000 in net present value in 1996 
dollars.43 
The National Academies agrees that “it is reasonable to omit the per 
capita cost of pure public goods, such as national defense, for the 
incremental cost to government of a single additional citizen,” because 
“the addition of a single citizen through immigration or birth cannot 
plausibly increase defense spending” or spending on any other pure 
public good.44 The National Academies report, however, presents 
many estimates based on scenarios that treat public goods as if they 
were private goods subject to congestion.45 With this change in 
assumptions, the National Academies would conclude that the average 
recent immigrant provides a net fiscal benefit of only $195,000 rather 
than $279,000 in net present value in 2012 dollars.46 
Thus, the National Academies report presents some estimates based 
on the false assumption that public goods are private goods. Why 
present these estimates as if they were as plausible as those based on 
the assumption that public goods are public goods? The National 
Academies report offers a peculiar explanation, claiming that “for 
larger increases in population through sustained immigration,” it may 
be better to assume that “spending on public goods” increases “with 
 
 41 Id. at 364. 
 42 NRC, supra note 20, at 302-03. 
 43 Id. at 345. 
 44 NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 461-62. 
 45 See id. at 364, 394-95. For example, the first four of eight scenarios presented 
assume that immigrants “incur the average cost of public goods,” as if they were 
congestible private goods. Id. at 364. The report presents five tables of estimates for 
the fiscal impact of immigrants and their descendants. See id. at 445-59. Two of these 
tables treat public goods as if they were private goods. See id. at 454-59. 
 46 Compare id. at 446 (estimating net fiscal benefit of $279,000 when public goods 
are excluded), with id. at 455 (estimating benefit of $195,000 when public goods are 
included).  
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the resulting population.”47 The only support the report offers for this 
alternative assumption is the empirical claim that “over time, public 
goods such as defense spending have been correlated with gross 
domestic product (GDP) and population size.”48 
The report’s alternative assumption here is based on a non sequitur. 
Even if we assume that the empirical claim is true, this observation 
would not imply that public goods should be treated as if they were 
private goods subject to congestion. If a nation decides to increase its 
spending on a pure public good like national defense or basic research, 
then the government does not do so because congestion requires an 
increase in spending to maintain the same level of the relevant service 
to its residents. Rather, the nation is choosing to take the fiscal benefit 
generated by a larger population and spend that extra tax revenue on a 
higher level of service to be enjoyed by each of its residents. That is, 
the nation chooses to consume that fiscal benefit, say, in the form of a 
stronger national defense, or in more resources devoted to a search for 
a cure for cancer. This higher spending buys benefits that the nation 
deems to be greater than the fiscal costs.49 In other words, the nation 
would be responding to a lower cost per capita for the same quantity 
of pure public goods by choosing to buy more of those goods, which 
would increase benefits for all residents, including natives and their 
descendants. Far from imposing any incremental costs on natives, 
more immigrants would allow natives to consume a larger stream of 
benefits from pure public goods while maintaining the same cost per 
capita for those goods. Thus, the NRC adopted the most reasonable 
treatment of public goods for its baseline scenario, and the alternative 
assumptions considered by the National Academies are based on an 
error in reasoning. 
2. The National Debt 
To generate estimates of fiscal impact, the NRC also had to make 
some assumptions about future fiscal policies in order to make 
realistic projections regarding future taxes and expenditures.50 As the 
 
 47 Id. at 462. 
 48 Id. at 345. 
 49 If a citizen disagrees and regards the spending to be a waste of money, then that 
citizen has a quarrel with the government’s spending decisions, not with its 
immigration policy. If immigration causes population growth, this growth still does 
not compel the nation to spend any more than the government already spends on pure 
public goods. 
 50 This discussion draws on observations made by Howard F. Chang, Introduction, 
in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IMMIGRATION, at xi, xxxii-xxxiii (Howard F. Chang ed., 
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NRC explains, “any government faces an overall constraint on its 
ability to use deficit finance,” which implies that no government can 
“let its debt grow without limit relative to the economy.”51 The 
problem confronting the NRC is that under “current fiscal rules” in 
the United States, “tax and expenditure policies will cause the debt to 
explode over time.”52 Therefore, the NRC assumes that the federal 
government brings the growth of the national debt under control 
through “a future fiscal adjustment,” that is, through “changes in taxes 
and expenditures” that stabilize “the ratio of debt to GDP . . . at some 
point.”53 
George Borjas objects to this assumption, which he argues “builds in 
the conclusion: immigration is beneficial because the country can 
spread the pain of a large tax bill over a larger population.”54 This 
conclusion, however, is not built into the NRC’s assumption so much 
as it is built into economic reality under the circumstances. The NRC 
explains that the alternative scenario, in which “debt never has to be 
controlled,” is unreasonable because this alternative “clearly leads to 
unrealistic debt levels.”55 
The NRC’s assumption is important to the calculation of the fiscal 
impact of the average immigrant. When the NRC adopts the 
alternative assumption, with no “budget adjustment,” the NRC 
projects that the average immigrant imposes a modest net fiscal 
burden of $15,000 rather than providing a net fiscal benefit of $80,000 
in net present value in 1996 dollars.56 Yet, even if we were to adopt 
this alternative scenario, in which “debt never has to be controlled,” 
then natives would never have to bear this supposed $15,000 fiscal 
burden through tax increases or spending cuts because this scenario 
assumes that the government can borrow without limit.57 Indeed, this 
scenario assumes that “the debt is allowed to grow with neither tax 
increases nor benefit cuts,” so that by assumption natives bear no 
increased tax burden as a result of immigration.58 Instead, in this 
scenario, taxpayers would avoid bearing this supposed $15,000 fiscal 
burden by borrowing, increasing the national debt without limit, and 
 
2015) [hereinafter Introduction]. 
 51 NRC, supra note 20, at 299. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 BORJAS, HEAVEN’S DOOR, supra note 28, at 125. 
 55 NRC, supra note 20, at 338. 
 56 Id. at 337. 
 57 See id. at 338. 
 58 Id. 
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making “all interest payments . . . by borrowing rather than by raising 
taxes.”59 This scenario is hardly what restrictionists have in mind 
when they claim that immigration imposes a burden on taxpayers.60 
Thus, for immigration to impose any fiscal burden on taxpayers that 
they cannot avoid by borrowing, a scenario must assume that a budget 
constraint ultimately imposes some limit on debt, so that more deficit 
spending today requires more fiscal restraint at some point in the 
future. The NRC appropriately makes such an assumption in its 
“baseline scenario.”61 Once a projection makes such a “fiscal 
sustainability” assumption, however, then the net fiscal impacts of 
immigrants must be “greater in a positive direction,” precisely because 
immigrants and their descendants would help shoulder the burden of 
“future spending cuts and tax increases.”62 This effect is why the NRC 
finds that a future budget adjustment implies an improved fiscal 
impact for the average immigrant. As soon as a scenario acknowledges 
that deficits have consequences for future taxpayers, the calculations 
must include the value of immigrants and their descendants as 
taxpayers who will share the future burden of the national debt. For 
this reason, a nation in debt should eagerly welcome more newcomers, 
who will help pay for the debts that natives have incurred through the 
public sector. The unrealistic alternative in which “debt never has to 
be controlled” is a scenario in which taxpayers do not need to bear any 
burden as a result of debt and thus “the effects of debt sharing are 
inconsequential.”63 
The National Academies report fails to include any scenario with a 
budget constraint like that adopted by the NRC’s baseline scenario. 
 
 59 Id. 
 60 For example, President Trump claims that the cuts to legal immigration 
proposed by the RAISE Act would “save taxpayers billions and billions of dollars.” 
Pestano, supra note 19 (quoting President Trump). 
 61 NRC, supra note 20, at 325. The NRC considers different assumptions for the 
timing of a future fiscal adjustment and finds that delaying this adjustment into the 
future increases the net present value of the average immigrant. See id. at 337-38. 
Thus, although the NRC baseline scenario assumed that fiscal adjustments would hold 
the debt/GDP ratio fixed starting twenty years later, in 2016, this assumption yields a 
relatively conservative estimate of the fiscal benefit conferred by the average 
immigrant in 1996, given that the national debt is now growing at an unsustainable 
rate. See Thomas Kaplan, Federal Budget Deficit Projected to Soar to Over $1 Trillion in 
2020, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2Hna41c (reporting that according to 
the Congressional Budget Office, the national debt is now on track to reach 96% of 
GDP by 2028, rising to “a higher level than any point since just after World War II 
and well past the level that economists say could court a crisis”). 
 62 NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 461. 
 63 NRC, supra note 20, at 338. 
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Instead, the National Academies report uses three different budget 
scenarios,64 and “all three of these scenarios assume unsustainable 
increases in deficits and debt over time.”65 Therefore, all three 
scenarios limit the fiscal benefit that immigrants and their descendants 
would contribute to deficit reduction or debt service and thus build in 
a bias against a positive fiscal impact from immigration. In this sense, 
all of the estimates reported by the National Academies are based on 
budget assumptions more conservative than used by the NRC baseline 
scenario. The National Academies scenario that comes the closest to 
fiscal sustainability is the “Deficit Reduction” scenario, which assumes 
some “tax increases and spending cuts” that at least reduce “the gap 
between federal spending and revenue.”66 The Deficit Reduction 
scenario that also treats public goods properly (that is, as public 
goods) is the scenario that predicts that the average recent immigrant 
confers a net fiscal benefit of $279,000 in net present value in 2012 
dollars.67 Although this prediction is the largest positive estimate 
presented by the National Academies report, even this estimate is at 
best a lower bound on what the appropriate calculation would derive 
using more reasonable assumptions regarding future budget 
adjustments. 
All estimates of fiscal impact presented by the National Academies 
are conservative estimates, not only because they all derive from 
scenarios that fail to impose any budget constraint on borrowing, but 
also because they all measure “the future net fiscal impact of an 
immigrant and descendants over a 75-year time horizon.”68 For a 
nation engaged in deficit spending, which shifts tax burdens to future 
generations, any calculation based on a limited time horizon will 
include the fiscal burden imposed by the current generation while 
excluding the fiscal benefit of future generations who must pay taxes 
to service the debt that they inherit. Thus, a limited time horizon 
biases the estimates of net fiscal impact in a negative direction, 
because much of the fiscal benefit of the average immigrant derives 
from the fiscal benefits produced in the more distant future. The NRC 
reports that after seventy-five years, the United States would realize 
only fifty-three percent of the long-run net present value of the fiscal 
benefit ultimately conferred by an immigrant and the immigrant’s 
 
 64 NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 410-12. 
 65 Id. at 438. 
 66 Id. at 411 (describing the “Deficit Reduction” scenario). 
 67 Id. at 446. 
 68 Id. at 410. 
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descendants.69 These estimates indicate that the net fiscal benefit of 
the average recent immigrant over a seventy-five-year time horizon has 
more than quadrupled in real terms over the past twenty years.70 
These considerations also suggest that if the National Academies had 
performed a calculation based on more appropriate assumptions, like 
those used by the NRC in its baseline scenario, the total long-run net 
present value of the fiscal benefit ultimately conferred by the average 
immigrant would prove to be more than double the $279,000 estimate 
presented in the National Academies report. Thus, that figure 
represents a very conservative estimate for the fiscal benefit conferred 
by the average immigrant today. 
B. Costly Backlogs and the Case for Liberalized Quotas 
In short, the economic literature suggests that natives on balance 
gain from immigration under current policies. If anything, the 
estimated economic and fiscal impacts of immigration militate in favor 
of higher levels of immigration, not lower levels. If we consider federal 
immigration laws from the perspective of economics, then the primary 
problem with our current admissions policies is that they are they are 
unduly restrictive. We have made it far too difficult for valuable 
workers and taxpayers to enter the United States. Quotas severely limit 
the supply of visas well below the demand for these visas and thereby 
create costly backlogs for those waiting for their immigration visas. 
A glance at the Visa Bulletin from the U.S. State Department for May 
2018 reveals the magnitude of the problem for various categories of 
immigration visas. For example, brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens 
receiving immigration visas waited at least thirteen years for their 
visas.71 Married sons or daughters of U.S. citizens waited at least 
twelve years for their visas.72 All categories of family-based 
 
 69 See NRC, supra note 20, at 343. This figure implies that over a 75-year time 
horizon, the United States would realize only $42,400 of the $80,000 net present value 
that the NRC predicts as the net fiscal benefit of the average immigrant. 
 70 See supra notes 27, 69. The NRC and the National Academies both use a three 
percent real discount rate to calculate net present values. NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra 
note 23, at 413 (using “a relatively conservative real discount rate of [three] percent”); 
NRC, supra note 20, at 325 (using three percent for the baseline scenario and other 
rates for alternative scenarios). 
 71 The sponsors for these immigrants filed their visa petitions no later than 
October 1, 2004. See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN: 
IMMIGRANT NUMBERS FOR MAY 2018, at 2 (2018), https://travel.state.gov/content/ 
dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_May2018.pdf. 
 72 The sponsors for these immigrants filed their visa petitions no later than 
February 1, 2006. See id. 
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immigration subject to quotas have backlogs, even spouses and minor 
children of lawful permanent resident aliens.73 
Furthermore, our immigration system also includes quotas that limit 
the number of these immigration visas available to any one country, 
and these quotas are completely insensitive to the population and to 
the demand for these visas in that country.74 These country quotas 
require our admissions process to discriminate against some 
applicants based on their national origin if they come from one of the 
countries that send us the greatest number of immigrants. Thus, if the 
sibling of a U.S. citizen comes from Mexico, then the wait is even 
worse than it is for most countries: that Mexican sibling has waited 
twenty years for a visa.75 If that sibling comes from the Philippines, 
then the wait is even longer: that sibling has waited more than twenty-
three years for a visa.76 
These country quotas not only aggravate backlogs for family-
sponsored immigration visas but also create backlogs for employment-
based immigration visas. For natives of India, even skilled workers 
and professionals have waited ten years for an employer-sponsored 
visa.77 Even professionals holding advanced degrees or workers with 
exceptional ability from India will have waited more than nine years, 
and those from China will have waited more than three years.78 These 
preference categories already reserve most employer-sponsored 
immigration visas for skilled workers with offers of employment, who 
are likely to contribute to the public treasury by paying income taxes 
and unlikely to rely on any means-tested entitlement programs.79 
Their immigration is especially likely to promote the economic welfare 
of those of us already here. 
 
 73 The sponsors of these spouses and children filed their visa petitions no later 
than June 1, 2016. See id. 
 74 See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(2) (2018) (placing limits on the total number of family-
sponsored and employment-based immigrant visas per country). 
 75 The sponsors of these immigrants filed their visa petitions on January 8, 1998. 
See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., supra note 71. 
 76 The sponsors of these immigrants filed their visa petitions on February 1, 1995. 
See id. 
 77 The employers of these immigrants applied or filed on May 1, 2018. See id. 
 78 The employers of these Indian immigrants applied or filed on December 22, 
2018, and the employers of these Chinese immigrants applied or filed on September 1, 
2014. See id. 
 79 See Howard F. Chang, Migration as International Trade: The Economic Gains 
from the Liberalized Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 371, 397 
(1998) [hereinafter Migration as International Trade]. 
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In fact, the studies conducted by the NRC and the National 
Academies found that age at the time of admission is an important 
factor determining the total fiscal impact of an immigrant.80 In general, 
the younger the immigrant at the time of arrival, the more years the 
immigrant can spend working in the United States, the more tax 
revenues the immigrant will contribute to public coffers prior to 
retirement, and the more positive the immigrant’s total fiscal impact.81 
In fact, immigrants to the United States are often young adults who 
will not participate in entitlement programs for the elderly for many 
years.82 
The older the immigrant at the time of entry, the less the immigrant 
will pay in taxes over the immigrant’s remaining years in this country, 
and the less favorable the fiscal impact of that immigrant. So longer 
backlogs make not only the immigrants but also natives worse off. 
Long waiting periods mean that immigrants enter later in life, limiting 
the years during which they can contribute to our economic welfare 
by providing labor as workers and by paying taxes to the public 
treasury. 
II. SELECTING IMMIGRANTS 
One might think that the obvious solution to the problem of excess 
demand for immigration visas would be to increase the visa supply, 
which would allow immigrants to enter while still young and thereby 
increase their economic and fiscal contributions to the welfare of 
natives. Liberalized quotas would improve the fiscal impact of each 
immigrant who enters more quickly as well as increase the influx of 
valuable workers and taxpayers. So how do the proponents of the 
RAISE Act justify reductions in the flow of immigrants instead of 
liberalizing reforms? Senator Cotton complains that “so many 
immigrants enter this country without job skills, or with very few 
skills,” so that they are “less likely to pay taxes” and “more likely to 
 
 80 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 445-59; NRC, supra note 20, at 350 
(noting that “the fiscal impact of an immigrant varies widely depending on age at 
arrival in the United States”). 
 81 See NRC, supra note 20, at 328-35; see also NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, 
at 445-59. 
 82 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 417 (noting that “our forecast of . . . 
net fiscal impact begins at a more advantageous age for government budgets” because 
“an average new immigrant today is more likely to be of working age than 20 years 
ago”); NRC, supra note 20, at 353 (“The average fiscal impact of immigrants under the 
baseline assumptions is positive in part because they tend to arrive at young working 
ages . . . .”). 
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use public assistance.”83 The virtue of the cuts imposed by the RAISE 
Act, according to this rationale, is that they exclude categories of 
immigrants likely to impose a fiscal burden. 
A. Fiscal Effects 
In particular, the RAISE Act would cut family-sponsored 
immigration by eliminating visas for siblings and adult children of U.S. 
citizens, perversely eliminating precisely those visa categories that face 
the greatest excess demand.84 Family-sponsored immigration accounts 
for most legal immigrants to the United States.85 Proponents of the 
RAISE Act, however, offer no empirical evidence that these family-
sponsored immigrants impose a net fiscal burden. Furthermore, the 
RAISE Act would also replace existing categories of employment-based 
immigration with a system that awards points based on education, the 
ability to speak English, high-paying job offers, and age.86 According 
to an estimate reported by the New York Times, only two percent of 
adult U.S. citizens would pass the thirty-point minimum required by 
this points system.87 
These drastic cuts to immigration go far beyond anything justified 
by the prospect of a fiscal burden and would instead exclude many 
immigrants who would have a positive impact on the economic 
welfare of natives. Estimates by the National Research Council in 1997 
and by the National Academies in 2017 both indicate that we can 
expect the average immigrant with at least a high-school education to 
have a positive fiscal impact overall, including the fiscal impact of 
their descendants.88 Only twenty-one percent of recent immigrants 
who are twenty-five years old or older have less than a high-school 
 
 83 Robinson, supra note 18 (quoting Sen. Cotton). 
 84 See Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy Act, S. 1720, 115th 
Cong. § 4 (2017); Nakamura, supra note 1. 
 85 See Baker, supra note 14 (reporting that family-sponsored immigrants 
accounted for sixty-four percent of immigrants to the United States in 2014). 
 86 See S. 1720 § 5; Julia Gelatt, The RAISE Act: Dramatic Change to Family Immigration, 
Less So for the Employment-Based System, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Aug. 2017), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/raise-act-dramatic-change-family-immigration-less-
so-employment-based-system. 
 87 Quoctrung Bui, How Many Americans Would Pass an Immigration Test Endorsed 
by Trump?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/ 
08/23/upshot/immigration-quiz-raise-act-trump.html. 
 88 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 446; NRC, supra note 20, at 334. 
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education, and fifty-five percent of these immigrants have more than a 
high-school education.89 
B. Income Distribution 
Proponents argue that the least skilled immigrants not only pose a 
risk of a fiscal burden but also drive down wages for the least skilled 
native workers. President Trump claims that “the RAISE Act will give 
American workers a pay raise by reducing unskilled immigration.”90 
Similarly, Trump’s policy adviser Stephen Miller defended the 
exclusion of “low-skill workers” as based on “compassion for 
American workers.”91 Immigration restrictions, according to this 
theory, protect native workers from foreign competition and thereby 
raise their wages. Does this protectionist theory provide a sound 
justification for restrictive immigration policies? 
1. Wage Effects 
Studies of the effects of immigration in U.S. labor markets have 
shown little evidence of any significant effects on native wages or 
employment, even for the least skilled native workers. When the 
National Academies surveyed the vast economic literature studying 
the wage effects of immigration in the United States, it concluded that 
“native dropouts tend to be more negatively affected by immigration 
than better-educated natives,” but “when measured over a period of 
more than 10 years, the impact of immigration on the wages of natives 
overall is very small.”92 In fact, “[e]stimated negative effects tend to be 
smaller (or even positive) over longer periods of time (10 years or 
more).”93 
Why does the entry of immigrant workers have so little effect on the 
wages of native workers? One reason is that the demand for labor does 
not remain fixed when immigrants enter the economy. Immigrant 
workers not only supply labor but also demand goods and services, 
and this demand will generate greater demand for locally supplied 
 
 89 NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 415. 
 90 Sheldon Richman, Unskilled Immigrants Do Not Harm Americans, AM. INST. 
ECON. RES. (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.aier.org/research/unskilled-immigrants-do-
not-harm-americans (quoting President Trump). 
 91 Baker, supra note 14 (quoting Stephen Miller). 
 92 NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 267. 
 93 Id. For another survey of this literature, see Chang, Introduction, supra note 50, 
at xv-xxvii. 
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labor.94 Furthermore, the entry of immigrant workers will increase 
profits for owners of capital in the sectors of the economy employing 
those workers, which will stimulate more investment in those sectors. 
The expansion of these sectors of the economy will also increase the 
demand for the types of labor employed in those sectors, which in 
turn would tend to offset the wage effects of increased labor supply.95 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence indicates that immigrant 
workers and native workers are imperfect substitutes in the labor 
market, so they often do not compete for the same jobs. In fact, 
immigrants in the United States tend to specialize in some occupations 
while natives specialize in others, based on the comparative advantage 
enjoyed by natives in English language skills.96 Thus, immigrant 
workers compete with one another far more than they compete with 
native workers. Indeed, immigrant workers may complement rather 
than compete with native workers, so that the net effect of an influx of 
immigrants may be to increase the demand for native labor and 
thereby increase native wages rather than depress them.97 
To the extent economists do find any evidence of a negative impact, 
it seems largely confined to natives with less than a high-school 
education and at most suggests a reason to worry about the 
immigration of workers with less than a high-school education.98 
Given the small effects of immigration on native wages, however, 
protectionist policies seem particularly misguided. Like trade barriers, 
immigration restrictions sacrifice gains from trade and thus reduce the 
total wealth of natives in the country of immigration. If immigration 
restrictions confer any benefit on any native worker, they do so only 
by inflicting a larger cost on other natives. In this sense, protectionist 
immigration restrictions would be a costly way to transfer wealth from 
some natives to other natives. 
 
 94 See Chang, Liberalized Immigration, supra note 11, at 1184. 
 95 See Howard F. Chang, Immigration Restriction as Redistributive Taxation: 
Working Women and the Costs of Protectionism in the Labor Market, 5 J.L. ECON. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 9 (2009) [hereinafter Redistributive Taxation]. 
 96 See Giovanni Peri & Chad Sparber, Task Specialization, Immigration, and Wages, 
1 AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 135, 145 (2009). 
 97 See Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano & Giovanni Peri, Rethinking the Effect of 
Immigration on Wages, 10 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 152, 187 (2012) (presenting estimates in 
which most, or all, native workers experienced economic gain from the immigration 
of workers to the United States from 1990 to 2006). 
 98 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 267 (noting that “some studies have 
found sizable negative short-run wage impacts for high school dropouts” whereas 
other studies have found “small to zero effects”). 
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2. Tax Reform as a Less Costly Response to Income Inequality 
To the extent that we are worried about after-tax income inequality, 
we could probably do more good at lower cost through progressive tax 
reforms than we can through new immigration restrictions.99 We 
could transfer the same wealth through the tax system rather than 
through protectionism and probably would thereby make all classes of 
natives better off than they would be under more restrictive 
immigration policies because immigration yields a net gain for natives 
as a group.100 Given the small adverse effects of immigration and the 
small number of native workers who may find their wages reduced by 
the influx of immigrant labor, a fairly small increase in the 
progressivity of our tax rates would suffice to offset any increase in 
income inequality among natives resulting from immigration. 
Redistribution through the tax system, of course, is not costless. 
Raising taxes on those with high incomes to make those with lower 
incomes better off will reduce the incentives for taxpayers to earn 
more income. Redistributive taxes would distort the incentives to 
work, to save, and to invest. These costly distortions, however, are 
inherent in any redistribution to address income inequality, whether 
the redistribution occurs through the tax system or through restrictive 
immigration policies. For example, if immigration restrictions reduce 
the return to capital or make wealthy natives less well off because they 
find the services they use to be more costly when fewer immigrant 
workers are available,101 then we have reduced the incentives to invest 
or to become wealthy. If immigration restrictions really do increase 
the wages of high-school dropouts relative to more educated workers, 
then they also reduce the incentives for students to complete high 
school and to invest in human capital. Immigration restrictions cause 
the same costly distortions as redistributive taxes would, and in 
addition, they sacrifice the gains that natives would enjoy from 
employing immigrants in the labor market.102 Immigration restrictions 
 
 99 For a more extended discussion setting forth this thesis, see generally Chang, 
Redistributive Taxation, supra note 95. 
 100 See id. at 11-12. 
 101 See Patricia Cortes, The Effect of Low-Skilled Immigration on U.S. Prices: Evidence 
from CPI Data, 116 J. POL. ECON. 381, 382 (2008) (finding that “low-skilled 
immigration lowers the prices of immigrant-intensive services such as gardening, 
housekeeping, babysitting, and dry cleaning”). 
 102 For a more general statement of the principle applied here, see Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 667, 667-68 (1994) (noting that “using legal 
rules to redistribute income distorts work incentives fully as much as the income tax 
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needlessly introduce a second distortion on top of the distortion that 
is inherent in income redistribution. 
This double distortion need not increase the cost of redistribution, 
however, if the two distortions “counteract one another.”103 In theory, 
the second distortion might mitigate the first distortion and thereby 
reduce the efficiency costs of redistribution. As I have noted in prior 
work, however, the empirical evidence on the effects of immigration 
“gives us ample reason to think that protectionist immigration 
restrictions introduce additional distortions that instead aggravate the 
distortion in work incentives associated with redistribution.”104 In 
particular, this evidence indicates that immigration restrictions drive 
up the cost of “services demanded disproportionately by households 
with working women” such as child care, food preparation, and 
housekeeping.105 The participation of working women in the labor 
force “is particularly sensitive to economic incentives.”106 This 
disparate impact on households in which both spouses work is 
especially likely to discourage work, which implies that “protectionist 
immigration restrictions distort labor supply more than necessary” to 
redistribute income from the wealthy to the poor.107 Thus, the special 
distortions introduced by immigration restrictions aggravate the 
 
system — because the distortion is caused by the redistribution itself — and also 
creates inefficiencies in the activities regulated by the legal rules”). 
 103 Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1017 (2001). 
 104 Chang, Redistributive Taxation, supra note 95, at 16. 
 105 Id. at 17-18. 
 106 Id. at 16. 
 107 Id. at 19. After the publication of Chang, Redistributive Taxation, supra note 95, 
several studies by economists soon supplied empirical evidence confirming the 
predicted effects of immigration on female labor supply in various countries. See, e.g., 
Guglielmo Barone & Sauro Mocetti, With a Little Help from Abroad: The Effect of Low-
Skilled Immigration on the Female Labor Supply, 18 J. LAB. ECON. 664, 669 (2011) 
(finding that immigrants are significantly and positively associated with hours worked 
by “highly educated” native women in Italy); Patricia Cortes & Jessica Pan, 
Outsourcing Household Production: Foreign Domestic Workers and Native Labor Supply 
in Hong Kong, 31 J. LAB. ECON. 327, 331 (2013) (finding that the admission of foreign 
domestic workers increased the labor force participation of mothers with young 
children in Hong Kong); Patricia Cortes & Jose Tessada, Low-Skilled Immigration and 
the Labor Supply of Highly Skilled Women, 3 AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 88, 90 (2011) 
(finding that low-skilled immigration has a positive and statistically significant effect 
on hours worked for working women in the United States); Lidia Farre et al., 
Immigration, Family Responsibilities and the Labor Supply of Skilled Native Women, 11 
B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 31 (2011) (finding that female immigrants increase 
the employment of college-educated native women with young children). For a survey 
of this literature, see Chang, Introduction, supra note 50, at xxix-xxx. 
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distortions inherent in income redistribution, supplying even more 
reasons to favor redistribution through the tax system instead. 
C. Rising Skill Levels Among Immigrants 
In any event, if we are worried about the effects of the least skilled 
immigrants in our labor market, then new restrictions on legal 
immigration are misguided for another reason: most immigrants with 
less than a high-school education have immigrated without 
authorization, not legally.108 Furthermore, although one would hardly 
know it, given the alarmist tenor of the debate over immigration, the 
flow of unauthorized immigrants into the United States has slowed to 
a trickle during the past decade. In fact, the unauthorized population 
has shrunk in absolute terms since 2007, after rising steadily during 
the preceding two decades.109 Net illegal immigration has been 
negative since the Great Recession, and lower fertility and improved 
economies in Latin America make this new reality likely to persist into 
the future.110 It is no coincidence that the population of less skilled 
immigrants has also become stable during the past decade, after 
growing dramatically during the preceding two decades.111 
In short, the RAISE Act, President Trump’s proposed “border wall,” 
and other costly and draconian proposals to increase border security112 
are misguided reactions to a perceived unskilled influx that largely no 
longer exists. The fiscal impact of the average immigrant has improved 
dramatically over the past twenty years precisely because immigrants 
are now more educated than ever before.113 The RAISE Act is based on 
 
 108 In 2013, “nearly two-thirds of the U.S. foreign-born adult population with 12 or 
fewer years of schooling” were unauthorized immigrants. Gordon Hanson et al., The 
Rise and Fall of U.S. Low-Skilled Immigration 1, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 23753, 2017). 
 109 See id. at 1 (reporting that the unauthorized immigrant population “declined in 
absolute terms between 2007 and 2014, falling on net by an annual average of 160,000 
individuals” after growing from 1990 to 2007 “by an annual average of 510,000 
individuals”); see also Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Overall Number of U.S. Unauthorized 
Immigrants Holds Steady Since 2009, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 20, 2016), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/09/20/overall-number-of-u-s-unauthorized-immigrants-
holds-steady-since-2009/. 
 110 See Hanson et al., supra note 108, at 2, 4-5, 30-44. 
 111 See id. at 2 (reporting that “the overall population of low-skilled immigrants of 
working age remained stable” between 2007 and 2014, after “rising from 8.5 million 
to 17.8 million” from 1990 to 2007). 
 112 See Parlapiano, supra note 7 (discussing proposed plans to phase out the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program). 
 113 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 414 (finding that “today’s 
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a false and outdated stereotype of the average immigrant to the United 
States. 
Current immigration policies have already successfully promoted 
the immigration of those with higher levels of education. Existing 
categories of employment-based immigration already require high 
levels of education, skill, or wealth, and the RAISE Act seems unlikely 
to offer much improvement over these visa categories.114 Even family-
sponsored immigration is subject to an exclusion ground that denies 
visas to those deemed “likely at any time to become a public 
charge.”115 This determination not only already takes into account the 
education, skills, assets, and age of the prospective immigrant but also, 
since 1996, has required sponsors to sign legally binding affidavits of 
support.116 Since 1996, these sponsorship requirements, which 
obligate sponsors to support all the relatives that they sponsor for 
immigration and to demonstrate the means to do so, have raised 
barriers that tend to screen out less educated family-sponsored 
immigrants.117 Furthermore, in “in determining the eligibility and the 
amount of benefits” of these family-sponsored immigrants “for any 
Federal means-tested public benefits program,” federal law deems the 
“income and resources” of these family-sponsored immigrants to 
include the “income and resources” of anyone who executed one of 
 
immigrants have more people in the highest educational groups and fewer in the 
lowest”); Richard Fry, Today’s Newly Arrived Immigrants Are the Best-Educated Ever, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/05/ 
todays-newly-arrived-immigrants-are-the-best-educated-ever/. 
 114 See Gelatt, supra note 86 (noting that the RAISE Act brings at best “slight” 
changes to “the employment-based immigration system,” with “the points structure 
largely echoing the existing preference for higher-educated, higher-paid workers or for 
investors”); Alex Nowrasteh, Sens. Cotton and Perdue’s Bill to Cut Legal Immigration 
Won’t Work and Isn’t an Effective Bargaining Chip, CATO INST. (Aug. 2, 2017), 
https://www.cato.org/blog/sens-cotton-perdues-bill-cut-legal-immigration-wont-work-
isnt-effective-bargaining-chip (noting that the RAISE Act “does not increase skilled 
immigration at all” because it “does not increase the numerical cap” for employment-
based immigration). 
 115 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (2018). 
 116 See id. § 1182(a)(4)(B) (listing factors to be taken into account in applying this 
exclusion ground); id. § 1182(a)(4)(C) (requiring a sponsor to execute “an affidavit of 
support”). 
 117 See id. § 1183. The obligation to support family-sponsored immigrants would 
tend to prevent or deter sponsorship for the least educated immigrants, who would be 
expected to earn the lowest wages and be the most likely to become eligible for 
means-tested public benefits in the future. See Chang, Migration as International Trade, 
supra note 79, at 404-06 (noting the barriers to sponsorship created by the 
requirement of affidavits of support). 
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these affidavits of support.118 Thus, family-sponsored immigrants are 
less likely to receive means-tested public benefits than other 
immigrants who are otherwise similarly situated. Furthermore, family-
sponsored immigrants are especially likely to adapt well to our labor 
market because their relatives in the United States can facilitate 
integration into our economy and our society. Finally, in a world in 
which countries compete to attract global talent, the ability to sponsor 
relatives for immigration may give the United States an advantage over 
other destinations in recruiting the most skilled immigrants.119 These 
considerations suggest that family-sponsored immigration confers net 
benefits on natives, especially since 1996, making it especially 
perverse for the RAISE Act to target this category of immigrants for 
new restrictions. 
D. Youth at the Time of Entry 
Even immigrants with less than a high-school education will have a 
positive fiscal impact if they immigrate while they are still young. 
Recall that youth at the time of entry is an important factor 
determining the total fiscal impact of an immigrant. Under the most 
reasonable assumptions considered by the National Academies, even 
the average recent immigrant with less than a high-school education 
who enters while less than twenty-five years old will have a positive 
total fiscal impact of $56,000 in net present value in 2012 dollars.120 
This empirical evidence indicates that the RAISE Act is especially 
perverse when it imposes new restrictions on the immigration of 
children. The RAISE Act would continue to allow U.S. citizens and 
permanent resident aliens to sponsor minor children for immigration 
but would restrict the class of eligible children, by bringing the age 
limit down from twenty-one to eighteen years old.121 This restriction 
would exclude young immigrants who are especially likely to 
contribute to the public treasury. 
President Trump’s decision to rescind DACA is similarly perverse 
from a fiscal perspective. The eligibility criteria for DACA ensures that 
beneficiaries immigrated while younger than sixteen years old and will 
 
 118 8 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (2018). 
 119 See Chang, Migration as International Trade, supra note 79, at 400-06. 
 120 See NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 23, at 446. Similarly, the NRC found that 
under its baseline scenario, the average immigrant who arrives at age twenty-one or 
younger will have a positive fiscal impact, even if the immigrant has less than a high-
school education. See NRC, supra note 20, at 358. 
 121 See Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy Act, S. 1720, 115th 
Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2017); Gelatt, supra note 86.  
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have at least a high-school education or the equivalent.122 These young 
and educated immigrants are especially likely to confer net benefits on 
natives through the public treasury. The expiration of their 
employment authorization or their deportation would perversely 
undermine their ability to contribute to the economic welfare of 
natives through their participation in the labor market and the 
payment of taxes. These are immigrants we should be eager to keep in 
our workforce and in our tax base; they should not be subject to 
removal. Congress would be serving the nation’s economic interests to 
grant legal status to DACA recipients and other immigrants like them, 
without the restrictions imposed by the RAISE Act on legal 
immigration. 
III. THE ALTERNATIVE OF LIBERALIZING REFORMS 
Immigration reform could promote more skilled immigration 
without the RAISE Act’s drastic cuts to immigration levels. For 
example, although the White House cites the points systems used to 
select immigrants in Canada and Australia as models for the RAISE 
Act,123 both of those countries also admit immigrants at much higher 
rates than the United States. As a fraction of their populations, Canada 
allows immigration levels more than twice as high as allowed under 
U.S. policies, and Australia allows immigration levels more than three 
times as high as allowed under U.S. policies.124 In fact, as a fraction of 
their populations, both Canada and Australia admit more family-based 
immigrants than the United States.125 If Congress were to take Canada 
and Australia as models for immigration reform in the United States, 
then reform would take the form of liberalization rather than more 
severe restrictions. 
 
 122 See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the 
United States as Children (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-
exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. 
 123 See President Donald J. Trump Backs RAISE Act, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 2, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-backs-raise-
act/ (describing the RAISE Act as using a system “similar to the merit-based immigration 
systems used by Canada and Australia”).  
 124 See Nowrasteh, supra note 114 (noting that in 2013, while U.S. immigration 
was equal to 0.31% of the U.S. population, Canadian immigration was equal to 0.74% 
of Canada’s population, and Australian immigration was equal to 1.1% of Australia’s 
population). 
 125 Id. 
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A. The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Proposed in 2013 
The comprehensive immigration reform bill passed by the Senate in 
2013 would have liberalized our immigration laws in various respects. 
Like the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have adopted a new merit-
based points system for visas, but unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill 
would have added this category of visas to the existing employment-
based immigration categories rather than replacing these categories.126 
Furthermore, the 2013 bill would have not only legalized many 
unauthorized immigrants already in the United States but also taken 
significant steps to address the problem of backlogs in our current 
system for legal immigration and expanded access to visas in several 
other respects. 
First, unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have provided 
sufficient visas to clear existing visa backlogs within seven years.127 
Unauthorized immigrants given legal status by the bill would not 
adjust their provisional status to permanent resident status until those 
backlogs were eliminated.128 These legalized immigrants would 
generally have to spend ten years in provisional status and would go to 
the back of the line for permanent resident status, behind those who 
have been waiting patiently for their immigration visas.129 
Second, unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have treated 
spouses and children of lawful permanent resident aliens as 
“immediate relatives,” which would exempt them from quotas 
entirely.130 Spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens can already 
enter as “immediate relatives” without any ceilings.131 The 2013 bill 
would have extended this treatment to the spouses and minor children 
of lawful permanent resident aliens. This solution would give priority 
to nuclear families and avoid backlogs for these relatives without 
taking immigration visas from any other categories. 
Third, unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would also have 
eliminated all quotas on the most skilled employment-based 
immigrants, including those with extraordinary ability, outstanding 
professors and researchers, multinational executives and managers, 
those with doctorate degrees, physicians, or workers who recently 
 
 126 See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization 
Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. §§ 2301, 2302 (2013). 
 127 See id. § 2302. 
 128 See id. § 2102 (specifying application procedures for adjustment of status). 
 129 See id. § 2302(c)(3)(B) (requiring at least ten years of legal status before 
adjustment to permanent resident status). 
 130 See id. § 2305. 
 131 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2018). 
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received advanced degrees in science, technology, engineering, or 
mathematics (“STEM”) fields from universities in the United States.132 
These STEM immigrants would also be exempt from labor certification 
requirements.133 Furthermore, the spouses and children of 
employment-based immigrants would not count toward quotas, which 
will allow more of these skilled immigrants to enter.134 By eliminating 
or liberalizing quantitative restrictions on both family-sponsored and 
employment-based immigration, the 2013 bill would have eliminated 
or reduced backlogs and thus would have been far better than the 
RAISE Act at increasing the economic and fiscal benefits of 
immigration. 
Fourth, like the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have eliminated 
ceilings based on the country of origin from all employment-based 
immigrant visas.135 These per country quotas have caused long waits 
for immigrants from the two most populous countries in the world, 
China and India. Like the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would allocate 
these visas on a country-neutral basis. This reform would be even 
better if it also applied to family-based visas, which should also be 
available without any discrimination based on national origin. 
Discrimination based on national origin needlessly introduces costly 
distortions in the allocation of visas.136 
Fifth, like the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have eliminated 
immigration visas for siblings of U.S. citizens, but unlike the RAISE 
Act, the 2013 bill would have eliminated such visas for adult children 
of U.S. citizens only if those children are married and more than 
thirty-one years old.137 Although the 2013 bill would needlessly 
impose these new restrictions on family-sponsored immigration, at 
least under the 2013 bill, they would have an alternative. Under the 
2013 bill, in the future, these relatives of U.S. citizens could apply for 
immigration visas under a new merit-based points system, which 
would award points based on factors such as education, employment 
 
 132 See S. 744 § 2307(b)(1). 
 133 See id. § 2307(b)(2). 
 134 See id. § 2307(b)(1). 
 135 See S. 744 § 2306; Reforming American Immigration for a Strong Economy Act, 
S. 1720, 115th Cong. § 5(b) (2017). 
 136 See Howard F. Chang, Liberal Ideals and Political Feasibility: Guest-Worker 
Programs as Second-Best Policies, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 465, 471 (2002) 
[hereinafter Liberal Ideals]; Alan O. Sykes, International Cooperation on Migration: 
Theory and Practice, 80 U. CHL. L. REV. 315, 330-31 (2013) (drawing an analogy 
between distortions due to visa discrimination and trade diversion due to 
discrimination in tariffs). 
 137 See S. 744 § 2307(a)(1). 
  
2018] The Economics of Immigration Reform 139 
experience, and youth, with at least some weight placed on family 
reunification.138 Like the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill designed its points 
system to select those expected to have the most positive effect on the 
U.S. economy, but unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would award 
some points for family ties to U.S. citizens.139 
Thus, although proponents of the RAISE Act cite Canada as a model 
for its points system, the 2013 bill included a points system that would 
more closely resemble the points system used by Canada, which also 
awards points based on family ties. The Canadian system recognizes 
that an adult relative living in Canada improves the ability of an 
immigrant to adapt to the Canadian economy and society. In fact, the 
Canadian system awards points for a far broader set of relatives than 
those currently allowed to sponsor relatives under the existing system 
in the United States.140 The points system in the 2013 bill would have 
acknowledged not only the moral relevance of family reunification but 
also the economic advantages of having a family network in the United 
States to facilitate adaptation and integration into our society. A points 
system would perform this role even better by awarding points for a 
broader set of relatives, as the Canadian system does. 
Sixth, unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have provided 
nonimmigrant visas for family-sponsored immigrants to enter, live in, 
and work in the United States while waiting for approval of their 
immigration visas.141 Thus, in the future, backlogs would not prevent 
the reunification of families nor delay the contributions that 
immigrants can make to our economy through the labor market or the 
public treasury. This reform would improve the expected economic 
and fiscal impact of each family-sponsored immigrant by allowing 
each relative to spend more productive years in the United States as a 
worker and taxpayer.142 
 
 138 See id. § 2301(a)(1). 
 139 See id. (awarding points to siblings and married sons and daughters of citizens). 
 140 Canada awards “adaptability” points to an immigrant for not only parents, children, 
and siblings but also grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, and nephews 
living in Canada, whether as a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident. See Six Selection 
Factors – Federal Skilled Workers (Express Entry), GOV’T OF CAN., https://www. 
canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/express-
entry/become-candidate/eligibility/federal-skilled-workers/six-selection-factors-federal-
skilled-workers.html#toc5 (last visited Sept. 9, 2018). 
 141 See S. 744 § 2309. 
 142 For a similar proposal to allow prospective immigrants waiting in backlogs to 
enter on nonimmigrant visas while waiting for their immigration visas, see Chang, 
Liberal Ideals, supra note 136, at 466-67. 
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Finally, unlike the RAISE Act, the 2013 bill would have created new 
nonimmigrant visa programs for less skilled workers: one program for 
agricultural visas and another for other workers.143 These W visas 
would allow workers to enter for a three-year period and would be 
renewable.144 These visas would allow workers within each category to 
leave one employer to work for another employer registered with the 
program, unlike past programs for guest workers, including the 
Bracero program, which typically tied each guest worker to a specific 
employer.145 The freedom to leave one employer and to accept 
employment with another would give workers more power to assert 
their rights against employers and thus prevent abuses, without 
sacrificing the economic benefits that natives derive in the labor 
market from employing alien workers.146 
In fact, an ideal program would offer the guest worker even more 
mobility than the 2013 bill did, including the ability to move freely 
among all sectors of the economy, rather than confining any guest 
workers to the agricultural sector.147 Full labor mobility would allow 
workers to pursue the best employment offer as market conditions 
change. This mobility would not only increase freedom and expand 
opportunities for the guest worker but also improve the efficiency of 
the labor market because it would allow workers to move among 
sectors in response to shifts in the demand for their labor. 
B. Nonimmigrant Visas 
From the perspective of the economic interests of natives, these 
nonimmigrant visas may be an effective response to concerns 
regarding the fiscal impact of less skilled alien workers.148 Through 
these guest-worker programs, natives enjoy the benefits of employing 
these workers in the labor market but do not bear the fiscal burden of 
providing the set of public benefits that these workers would receive if 
they had permanent residence and access to citizenship through 
naturalization. Although immigrants can gain full access to public 
benefits upon naturalization, only those “admitted for permanent 
 
 143 See S. 744 §§ 2231, 4702. 
 144 See id. §§ 2232, 4703. 
 145 See id.; see also Howard F. Chang, Guest Workers and Justice in a Second-Best 
World, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 3, 7 (2008) [hereinafter Guest Workers]. 
 146 See Chang, Liberal Ideals, supra note 136, at 470-71. 
 147 See Chang, Guest Workers, supra note 145, at 7-8. 
 148 See id. at 4. 
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residence” may naturalize as U.S. citizens.149 Guest workers admitted 
on nonimmigrant visas are not admitted as permanent residents and 
are therefore not eligible for most public benefits and are not eligible 
for naturalization. 
Our laws generally exclude not only unauthorized immigrants but 
also nonimmigrants from a broad range of public benefits. With only 
narrow exceptions, these aliens are ineligible for “any Federal public 
benefit.”150 Because nonimmigrant visas can give less skilled alien 
workers access to our labor markets without granting full access to the 
benefits available to citizens, these visas may allow the most liberal 
admissions policies possible for these aliens without imposing a fiscal 
burden on natives. 
By allowing natives to enjoy gains from trade with guest workers in 
the labor market, the approach adopted by the 2013 bill would be 
more likely to promote the economic welfare of natives than the 
RAISE Act. In fact, we could even go beyond the 2013 bill and 
accommodate the desire of some guest workers to remain by allowing 
guest workers to renew their visas for an indefinite number of multiple 
periods.151 As long as we restrict their access to public benefits, they 
seem unlikely to impose a net fiscal burden on the public treasury.152 
Such a program, however, raises the prospect of de facto permanent 
residents with only restricted access to citizenship and to public 
benefits. If we expand our objectives beyond a narrow focus on the 
economic interests of natives, then we may find this prospect 
troubling. The political theorist Michael Walzer argues that a society 
that relies on guest workers for labor is “a little tyranny” in which 
guest workers are ruled “by a band of citizen-tyrants.”153 From the 
perspective of the interests of the guest workers, or from the 
perspective of principles of “political justice” in a “democratic state,” 
the ideal policy would provide the option of lawful permanent 
residence and ultimately, access to citizenship.154 
 
 149 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2018). 
 150 Id. § 1611(a). 
 151 See Chang, Guest Workers, supra note 145, at 12 (suggesting that we “allow 
guest workers to renew their nonimmigrant visas with no limit on the number of 
possible renewals”). 
 152 See id. (citing empirical evidence suggesting that a guest worker “would 
probably have a net positive impact” even if the worker “has less than a high-school 
education”). 
 153 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 52, 
58 (1983). 
 154 Id. at 60 (arguing that the right to citizenship through naturalization should be 
“subject only to certain constraints of time and qualification”). 
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C. The Path to Citizenship 
To better reflect democratic ideals, we could offer a path to 
citizenship for guest workers who compile a sufficiently long record of 
employment while avoiding any criminal activity. In fact, under the 
2013 bill, workers on W visas could apply for permanent residence 
through a merit-based points system, which would award points for 
each year spent working lawfully in the United States up to a limit of 
twenty points.155 With a path to possible permanent residence and 
ultimately citizenship, admission as a guest worker need not imply 
permanent status as an alien. 
Would a path to citizenship for less skilled immigrants raise the 
prospect of a fiscal burden? Not if we require guest workers to spend 
years in nonimmigrant status first, which would delay their access to 
the full set of public benefits that are available to citizens. This delay 
would improve the fiscal impact of each guest worker who adjusts 
status to that of a permanent resident. The longer the delay, the 
greater the improvement in the fiscal impact of each immigrant. The 
estimates generated by the NRC for the fiscal impact of immigrants 
suggest that we could allow even less skilled immigrants to naturalize 
without imposing a net fiscal burden if a sufficiently long period with 
limited access to public benefits has passed.156 
These observations would apply not only to guest workers on W 
visas but also legalized immigrants with provisional status. The 2013 
Senate bill would have allowed these aliens to work and pay taxes in 
the United States without access to specified public benefits while 
seeking permanent resident status.157 By denying legalized immigrants 
access to public benefits for many years, the 2013 bill would have 
 
 155 See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization 
Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2301(a)(1) (2013). 
 156 Taking the fiscal impact of an immigrant’s descendants into account, the NRC 
found that the average immigrant with less than a high-school education imposes a 
net fiscal burden of only $13,000 in net present value in 1996 dollars under the NRC’s 
baseline scenario. See NRC, supra note 20, at 334. The NRC also found that the 1996 
welfare legislation would improve the fiscal impact of the average immigrant by 
$8,000 by excluding immigrants from seven specified means-tested benefits for only 
their first five years in the United States. See id. at 339. Nonimmigrants are ineligible 
for “any Federal public benefit,” which includes an even broader set of benefits than 
those considered by the NRC. 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2012). Thus, the NRC estimates 
suggest that a sufficiently long period of nonimmigrant status would avoid the fiscal 
burden otherwise predicted for an immigrant with less than a high-school education. 
 157 See S. 744 §§ 2101(a), 2211(c)(3) (restricting access to public benefits for 
legalized immigrants and for guest workers). 
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improved the fiscal impact of each immigrant while still providing a 
path to permanent resident status. 
In reality, access to citizenship is a matter of degree. A guest worker 
could have the opportunity to adjust status only after a short period in 
the United States or only after a long period. We can demand many 
years of work experience in the United States, or we can impose less 
demanding requirements. Congress could choose any point along this 
continuum to satisfy critics concerned about the impact of less skilled 
immigrants on the public treasury. By adjusting the number of points 
a guest worker could earn through years of work in the United States 
and by adjusting the number of immigrant visas issued through this 
points system, we can adjust the guest worker’s prospects for 
permanent residence and the number of years that a guest worker 
could expect to wait to adjust status. 
In fact, the flexibility of such a points system is a virtue that might 
also facilitate a political compromise on a path to citizenship for 
unauthorized immigrants granted legal status. In 2013, some 
Republicans in the House of Representatives expressed a willingness to 
grant legal status to unauthorized immigrants, but they also objected 
to the “special” path to citizenship provided by the Senate bill.158 A 
possible compromise would allow legalized immigrants to apply for 
permanent resident status through the same immigration system that 
is open to all prospective immigrants. If Congress were to liberalize 
that immigration system enough, so that enough legalized immigrants 
could have a realistic chance of eventually obtaining permanent 
resident status, then we could have the basis of a compromise that 
might finally allow comprehensive immigration reform to emerge from 
Congress. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the proponents of the RAISE Act advance economic claims 
on behalf of their restrictionist proposals, these claims do not hold up 
under scrutiny. In fact, the economic and fiscal effects of immigration 
imply net benefits for natives, both in the labor market and through 
the public sector. Economists estimate that immigrant workers add 
 
 158 See, e.g., Julia Preston, Illegal Immigrants Are Divided Over Importance of 
Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/us/ 
illegal-immigrants-divided-over-the-importance-of-citizenship.html (reporting on 
Republicans in Congress open to an “appropriate legal status for unlawful 
immigrants” and “allowing those with family ties here to naturalize eventually 
through regular channels” but opposed to “any special path to becoming Americans”). 
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billions of dollars per year to the real income of natives in the United 
States by supplying their labor to our labor market. Furthermore, 
immigration also makes us better off by increasing tax revenues in the 
United States. These findings suggest that higher levels of immigration 
would produce even larger benefits for the U.S. economy. So why not 
liberalize our immigration policies instead of imposing new 
restrictions? 
The comprehensive immigration reform bill passed by the Senate in 
2013 would have liberalized our immigration laws in various respects 
and thus would have done a much better job than the RAISE Act in 
serving the economic interests of natives. The RAISE Act’s hostility 
toward family-sponsored immigration, in particular, lacks a sound 
basis in empirical evidence or careful economic analysis. The 2013 bill 
would improve the economic and fiscal benefits of immigration by 
clearing backlogs and expanding access to both immigrant and 
nonimmigrant visas. The liberalizing proposals in the 2013 bill 
provide a promising foundation for comprehensive immigration 
reform and should be the basis for future changes to the laws 
governing legal immigration in the United States. 
